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DIGNITY TAKINGS IN GANGLAND’S SUBURBAN FRONTIER
LUA KAMÁL YUILLE*
PREFACE: LOC’D UP, CORNERED, & BANISHED
The background is idyllic. This encounter must have been captured at 
what filmmakers call the magic hour; that period shortly before sunset 
when the light is perfect. The streets are lined with palm trees. Quaint mid-
century, middle class houses sit in neatly appointed yards, whose trimmed 
green lawns belie the state’s debilitating water crises. This is why people 
live in California. The foreground, though, is more menacing. It is not that 
this corner is occupied by three Black youths that makes it menacing. In-
deed, the young man that begins to speak is striking, charismatic, engag-
ing, and confident. “They call me Trezy Loc.” What is menacing is the way
he surveils the block intently, the conspicuously blue clothes that he wears, 
the tattoos he displays, the hand symbols he periodically raises, the indeci-
pherable messages he shouts at passersby, and the children’s snack food 
box he wields that appears to conceal a gun. They are standing on the cor-
ner claiming their neighborhood. They are occupying the space, both geo-
graphic and psychological. And they are occupying it by threat of force.
Trezy Loc now sits on the street curb. Four police cars, sirens lit, have 
surrounded him. Despite the name, he has never been convicted or even 
charged with a criminal offense. Still, this is not the first time he has been 
stopped. It is not the tenth time. He has lost count. But he recalls it started 
when he was about thirteen years old. And he knows what happens next. He 
is told to take down his pants. He has to lift up his shirt. They call him 
names, but do not use his name. They toss the content of his backpack on 
the ground. They pat him down. They stick their hands in his pockets. They 
manhandle him as he is posed for the photographs they snap of him—half-
nude and exposed—on the street. He hangs his head as, in this small town, 
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. For their invaluable comments on the 
earliest iterations of this project, thanks to Neil Komesar, Heinz Klug, Peter Carstensen, Shubha Ghosh, 
Guy Uriel Charles, Dorothy Brown, Timothy Lovelace, Bertrall Ross, Karen Bradshaw Schulz and 
others too numerous to mention. Local government, law enforcement, school administration, and gang 
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he sees a classmate pass by; and then his teacher; and finally his grand-
mother, who calls out that she will call someone to help. She does not stop. 
She does not want to make things worse. He was just walking home from 
school. But, the police find what they call contraband: pens and pencils, his 
school notebook, and the pad he uses to write lyrics and poetry. “Viola-
tion,” they tell him. “We’re keeping these as evidence.” He teacher will not 
accept that excuse. He still wonders what they did with his biology class 
notes.
Now, Trezy Loc sits melancholy in the back of his mother’s car. A 
large duffle bag sits next to him. He does not talk, his charisma and confi-
dence buried under the weight of what happens next. The drive to the air-
port feels longer than the hour that passes on the clock. The walk through 
the crowed terminal at Los Angeles International Airport feels lonely. The 
music that leaks from his Beats by Dr. Dre headphones do not drown out 
his thoughts. His mother is unsympathetic. “Things will be safer for you in 
Georgia.” She tells him. “You’ll be better there.” He knows he has no de-
fense. But he feels compelled to say something. So he responds with the 
truth. “But Georgia isn’t home . . . . It won’t be home.” His mother is re-
signed to this banishment. “We will visit you, Gregory,” she calls him by 
his given name.
The ideas explored in this article germinated long before Trezy Loc1
recounted his experiences to me in one of the qualitative interviews on 
which this article bases its analysis. Though—in many ways—particular 
and unique, his story is also highly representative of the ambivalent posi-
tioning of street gang2 members. During the formal interview, he was polite 
and reserved but talked at length about his experiences with the gang in-
junction to which he was subject and that led him to be sent to Texas for 
several years. As he left, however, he directed me to the video clip de-
scribed above. “Please don’t judge me,” were his last words to me. This 
ambivalence is a central motivator for this article and the broader project of 
which it forms one part.3 Nothing I have learned about gangs since this 
1. Not his real name.
2. As has been my practice in previous work, this article and the study on which it is based 
limits its discussion to contemporary, U.S.-based, street gangs for definitional, conceptual, and practical 
reasons. While comparisons may be made among street gangs discussed here and U.S. prison gangs, 
domestic and international organized criminal organizations (i.e. the mafia), and other international and 
transnational gangs, those variations remain beyond the scope of the present analysis. This distinction is 
consistent with the practice of a range of gang observers. See, e.g., NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR.,
2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT 7–8 (2013), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-
publications-national-gang-report-2013/view [https://perma.cc/P5NN-XKJB] (distinguishing among 
street gangs, prison gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and other gangs).
3. For the first article based on this line of inquiry, see Lua Kamál Yuille, Blood In, Buyout: A 
Property & Economic Approach to Street Gangs, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 1049 (2015).
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work began has convinced me that they are institutions that the law should 
shore up or maintain. However, through the process, gangs and their mem-
bers have been humanized. Law and policy directly and indirectly strips 
gang members of this fundamental quality, treating them as sub-persons.4
This project contributes to addressing gangs as human institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
If you are familiar with popular cinema or television, you are likely 
familiar with Monrovia, California, though you would not know it. This 
“gem,”5 an All America City6 nestled at the foot of the San Gabriel Moun-
tains, serves as the filming location for scores of stories set in quaint every-
body’s America. The city was home to the first McDonald’s hamburger 
stand (before it was so named);7 offered opulence on the historic Route 
66;8 and in fact, is the fourth oldest in Los Angeles County.9 But not every-
thing in Monrovia is so serene. Situated just thirty miles from the heart of 
America’s gang “epidemic,”10 Monrovia lies in gangland’s suburban fron-
tier. As a consequence, it has faced a forty-year history with legitimate 
street gangs. In 2009, the city of Monrovia sought and obtained a public 
nuisance abatement (commonly known as a gang injunction) to enjoin the 
activities of the city’s primary gangs, the DuRoc Crips and Monrovia Nue-
vo Varrio.
4. See infra Section IV.B.2.
5. The city is known as the “Gem City of the Foothills.” Geoff Kelly, Monrovia is Rooted in 
Nature and in Family, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/22/realestate/re-
guide22 [https://perma.cc/6AEJ-2B34].
6. In 1995, the city was recognized by the National Civic League as an All-America City to 
recognize its “innovation, impact, inclusiveness, civic engagement, and cross-sector collaboration to 
address pressing local challenges.” Award-Winning City, CITY OF MONROVIA, CAL.,
http://www.cityofmonrovia.org/discover-monrovia/award-winning-city [https://perma.cc/G4QK-
32RK].
7. Richard and Maurice McDonald opened “the Airdrome,” an octagonal food stand, on Route 
66 in 1937. Three years later, they moved the restaurant to San Bernardino, California, eventually 
renaming it McDonald’s. See History of McDonalds, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_McDonald%27s [https://perma.cc/STU5-A4XL].
8. Architect Robert B. Stacy-Judd purposely misnamed Monrovia’s Aztec Hotel, which is 
recognized as the first use of the principles of Mayan art and architecture in a contemporary American 
building. Aztec Hotel, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/route66/aztec_hotel_monrovia.html [https://perma.cc/3YSY-XMXN].
9. Founded on December 15, 1887, it was preceded by Los Angeles (April 4, 1850), Pasadena 
(June 19, 1886), and Santa Monica (November 30, 1886). See Local Agency Formation Commission,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Agency_Formation_Commission
[https://perma.cc/YT9H-Z6VE].
10. Scott H. Decker, A Decade of Gang Research: Findings of The National Institute of Justice 
Gang Portfolio, in RESPONDING TO GANGS: EVALUATION AND RESEARCH 3 (Winfred L. Reed & Scott 
H. Decker eds., 2002).
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This article examines Monrovia’s gang injunction and uses the dignity 
takings framework developed by Bernadette Atuahene in We Want What’s 
Ours to understand the scope of the harms associated with it. Through qual-
itative analyses of semi-structured interviews, legal documents, and other 
documents, it demonstrates that the dispossession of identity property asso-
ciated with suburban gang injunctions, damages identity and feelings of 
community worth, and dehumanizes enjoined individuals in a way that 
deprives them of their fundamental right of dignity, constituting a clear 
example of a dignity taking. Like other developments in the burgeoning 
dignity takings canon, the article demonstrates the prevalence of dignity 
takings and illustrates the value of appreciating the dignity harms associat-
ed with government action.
II. INVOLUNTARY PROPERTY LOSS, DIGNITY TAKINGS, & PROPERTY
The concept of involuntary property loss—”when a person, entity, or 
state confiscates, destroys, or diminishes rights to property without the 
informed consent of rights holders”11—is a broad, varied, but holistically 
under-theorized vector of property experience. Traditional, constitutional 
takings under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution repre-
sent this kind of property loss. But it also includes property doctrines rang-
ing from adverse possession and partition sale to zoning and defeasible 
interests in land. Less institutionalized property mechanisms—eviction, 
foreclosure, or even gentrification—are likewise situated in the category. 
And the idea can even encompass the loss occasioned by natural disasters 
when the government directly or indirectly impacts and structures how that 
loss is experienced.12
In her exciting contribution to the takings canon and involuntary prop-
erty loss discourse, We Want What’s Ours, Bernadette Atuahene offers 
what she terms a dignity taking framework. This type of involuntary prop-
erty loss has occurred when “a state directly or indirectly destroys property 
or confiscates various property rights from owners or occupiers and the 
intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantiliza-
tion.”13 This new conceptualization addresses a central weakness in pre-
vailing involuntary property loss doctrines by confronting the ways they 
11. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2016).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 178; see also Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating 
a New Theoretical Framework to Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Re-
quired, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016).
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fail to account for (even when they recognize) circumstances when the loss 
associated with property deprivation includes social, emotional, political, 
and cultural values of property that are incommensurate with measurement 
as a financial commodity. This framework recognizes that taking of identi-
ty property—i.e. that property that implicates epistemological, ontological, 
and vocational humanity—inflicts harm that is erased in dominate dis-
courses on involuntary property loss, especially constitutional takings doc-
trine. The nature of these unappreciated unquantifiable harms render 
dignity takings an extraordinary class of egregious takings.
A growing cadre of scholars have engaged Atuahene’s framework to 
“demonstrate[] that dignity takings have been a standard and ongoing pro-
cess . . . of the normal working of property systems.”14 Nonetheless, as 
currently conceptualized the dignity takings framework is circumscribed in 
three very important ways. Though not articulated in these terms, dignity 
takings center on property deprivations in recognition of property’s special 
value as a resilience building institution. That is property is allows people 
to confront, adapt to, ameliorate, compensate for, or contain their inherent, 
constant condition of vulnerability stemming from their unalterable condi-
tion as humans.15 Property is personhood.16 Property is entrance into a 
community.17 Property is human flourishing.18 Property is status.19 Proper-
ty is freedom.20 Property is independence and, thus, democracy.21 Property 
14. Alexandre Kedar, Dignity Takings and Dispossession in Israel, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 866, 
868 (2016).
15. To engage the growing literature exploring the human condition of vulnerability, see Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718–19 (2012); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multi-
ple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 634–35 (2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: 
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008); Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 267–70 (2010). For 
further examples of vulnerability theory, see generally VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW 
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013); 
Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative: Publications, EMORY UNIV.,
http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/resources/Publications.html [https://perma.cc/8HZJ-RT8X] 
(collecting resources regarding vulnerability theory). An articulation of the role of property in fostering 
resilience can be found in Lua K. Yuille, Property as Resilience (May 21, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
16. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Eduardo Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005).
18. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006).
19. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009).
20. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36 (2009) 
(exploring the legal and discursive relationship among property and freedom).
21. See generally Joseph W. Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1 
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 913 (2011); Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of 
Democracy, in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2011); GREGORY S.
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is power.22 But the property with which the dignity takings framework is 
primarily occupied is narrowly conceived. It is exclusion-centric.23 It is 
possessive. It is in rem.24 And it is positive.25
There is undeniable value in disciplining the dignity takings frame-
work. It has the potential to become so expansive that it loses analytical 
value. However, as will be developed below, there is room to capture a 
broader conception of property, which better reflects the lived-experience 
of the subjects of this study.
III. GANGS, IDENTITY PROPERTY & THE MONROVIA GANG
INJUNCTION
After the glitz and glamour of Hollywood, Los Angeles, California, is 
known as birthplace of the modern criminal street gang. There, the impact 
of the post-industrial era on and the introduction and popularization of 
crack cocaine in working class urban minority communities catalyzed an 
opportunistic evolution in networked juvenile delinquency.26 Perhaps be-
cause of the proximity, neither romanticized, like Michael Corleone,27 nor
aggrandized, like Tony Montana,28 Los Angeles’s street gangs have been 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 30–33 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
23. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
24. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (defining the in rem character as the “distinctive type of 
right to a thing, good against the world”).
25. DAVID SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43 (1992) (quoting 
Blackstone as saying “a conventional institution created by law, habit, or the passage of time . . . . [The] 
rules prescribing its use and transfer were determined by society.”); see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 248 (1994) (“[P]roperty is, of 
all the basic rights, perhaps, most obviously the creation of the state.”).
26. See, e.g., John Hagedorn, Gangs as Social Actors, in THE ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY READER
141, 143–46 (Stuart Henry & Mark Lanier eds., 2006); John Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Post-
Industrial Era, in 24 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH: YOUTH VIOLENCE 365, 389–90 
(Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998). 
27. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
28. See, e.g., Bernard Beck, The Myth That Would Not Die: The Sopranos, Mafia Movies, and 
Italians in America, MULTICULTURAL PERSP., Apr. 2000, at 24, 26; Arthur Knight, Nearer, My Godfa-
ther, to Thee, SATURDAY REV., Mar. 25, 1972, at 16 (“The Godfather elevates the gangster movie to a 
new and impressive level . . . . In The Godfather, we are dealing with people—home-loving, tightly 
knit, folksy people—who also happen to kill a lot. If we are to understand their mores, we must also 
accept this peculiar penchant of theirs.”); Pauline Kael, Everyday Inferno, NEW YORKER, Oct. 8, 1973, 
at 157 (“Was the audience envying them their close family ties and the vitality of their lawlessness? 
Was it envying their having gotten used to a sense of sin?”); Edward LiPuma, Capitalism and the 
Crimes of Mythology: An Interpretation of the Mafia Mystique, J. ETHNIC STUD., Summer 1989, at 1, 1 
(quoting Dwight C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, in AN INQUIRY INTO ORGANIZED CRIME (Luciano J. 
Iorizzo ed., 1971)). These positive connections do not ignore the sustained critique, especially by 
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consistently derided by the city’s Hollywood neighbor as a blight on urban 
communities.29 This fatalistic and intractable image dominates law and 
policy: Gangs are “poison.”30 Gangs are “brutal outlaws.”31 Gangs are so 
unfathomably bad that even law enforcement “don’t know what the hell to 
do about it.”32
The reputation is so powerful that Los Angeles’s Crip and Blood 
gangs have achieved national penetration and international notoriety,33
putting the city at the forefront of anti-gang law enforcement innovation. 
Growing out of this experimentation, nearly thirty years ago, the city 
sought the world’s first civil injunction against the Playboy Gangster Crips, 
as an unincorporated entity, whose activities it claimed constituted a public 
nuisance.34 A decade later, the Supreme Court of California sanctioned Los 
Angeles’s innovative practice by then known as a civil gang abatement 
action.35 Despite heavy criticism,36 judicial imprimatur permitted the prac-
tice to evolve into the gang injunctions seen today, and such civil remedies 
have become a principal tool in addressing gang activity not only across 
California but in jurisdictions across the country and internationally.37
Italian-American groups of the image of Italian criminality. However, it highlights glorifica-
tion/denigration dichotomy among organized crime films.
29. Including such films as AMERICAN ME (Universal Pictures 1992), NEW JACK CITY (Warner 
Bros. Pictures 1992), and MI VIDA LOCA (Sony Pictures Classics 1994). The gang genre and other 
“‘hood” films have been thoroughly critiqued by commentators from diverse academic orientations. 
Interestingly, among the critiques are claims that the films glorify criminality in precisely the way mafia 
movies do. See, e.g., Chris J. Przemieniecki, Gang Behavior and Movies: Do Hollywood Gang Films 
Influence Violent Gang Behavior?, 12 J. GANG RES., Winter 2005, at 41, 58–59. The positive impact of 
these films, including opening space in which debates about people living in marginalized communities 
could direct the debate over the issues they face, has also been explored. See Cameron McCarthy et al., 
Danger in the Safety Zone: Notes on Race, Resentment, and the Disocurse of Crime, Violence, and 
Suburban Security, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE/PEDAGOGY: THE MEANING OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
IN UNSETTLING TIMES 211 (Dennis Carlson & Michael W. Apple eds., 1998).
30. Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs [https://perma.cc/S8LN-Y93D].
31. ACLU FOUND. OF S. CAL., FALSE PREMISE/FALSE PROMISE: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG 
INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 (1997) (quoting then-Los Angeles City Attorney Hahn). 
32. Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
739, 739 (1990) (quoting then-Los Angeles police chief Daryl F. Gates).
33. “The competition between the Bloods and the Crips has assumed almost legendary status.”
Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 109 (1997) 
(citing IRVING SPERGEL, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, GANG 
SUPPRESSION AND INTERVENTION: AN ASSESSMENT 33 (1993)). For a description of these notorious 
gangs, see, e.g., ALEJANDRO A. ALONSO, TERRITORIALITY AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICAN STREET 
GANGS IN LOS ANGELES (1999); R. D. Flores, Crips and Bloods, CRIME & JUST. INT’L, Oct. 1997, at 6 .
34. Id. at 320. 
35. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
36. First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process challenges to these 
injunctions failed to gain any real traction.
37. MATTHEW D. O’DEANE, GANG INJUNCTIONS AND ABATEMENT: USING CIVIL REMEDIES TO
CURB GANG-RELATED CRIMES 441–49 (2012); Gang Injunctions: Problem or Solution?, NAT’L RADIO 
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In the same period during which gang injunctions evolved, a conflu-
ence of factors (including, no doubt, the success of urban gang injunctions) 
led to the entrenchment of legitimate gang activity in suburban communi-
ties. Faced with urban problems, those communities have turned to urban 
solutions, and in the past several years, gang injunctions have been de-
ployed in small suburban outposts. Monrovia, California, is one such com-
munity.
This brief account presents gangs as criminal organizations and gang 
injunctions as law enforcement tools, which is consistent with dominant 
discourse. That perspective would suggest that—even if gang injunctions 
are the “racist, draconian mallets”38 many see them as—the dignity takings 
framework is inapposite.39 However, properly understood, both gangs and 
gang injunctions present and engage property issues. Specifically, gangs 
are engines for the development of identity property, and gang injunctions 
are, essentially, land use management tools designed to destroy or repos-
sess that identity property and banish its owners from the community.
A. Gangs & Identity Property
Despite the terroristic image of gangs and gang violence that domi-
nates popular legal consciousness, there is an interdisciplinary scholarly 
consensus, which has deepened and extended since gangs were first studied 
in the 1920s,40 holding that gangs are caused by the absence or breakdown 
of community institutions (family, school, church and local government) 
that transmit mainstream social norms.41 These norms take the form of 
capital, or resources, that individuals use to facilitate either their acquisition 
of additional capital or social mobility.42 Gangs fill this institutional gap 
PROJECT (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.radioproject.org/2011/12/gang-injunctions-problem-or-solution/ 
[https://perma.cc/79C4-MGR2]; Dominic Casciani, Gang Injunctions Launched in England and Wales,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12311184 [https://perma.cc/T3AW-PAUY].
38. Yuille, supra note 3, at 1055.
39. Whether a principled, logical, and meaningful expansion of the framework to contexts not 
involving involuntary property loss is beyond the scope of the present study.
40. FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO (1927). 
41. See, e.g., Irving Spergel & G.D. Curry, The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and
Development Process, in THE GANG INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 359–400 (Arnold P. Goldstein & C. 
Ronald Huff eds., 1993). Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Antecedents of Gang Membership, in THE
MODERN GANG READER (Malcolm W. Klein et al. eds., 1995).
42. Pierre Bourdieu taxonomized as economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. Pierre Bour-
dieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
EDUCATION (John G. Richardson ed., 1986). For a brief intellectual history of the “plethora of capitals,”
see Michael Woolcock, Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis 
and Policy Framework, 27 THEORY & SOC’Y 151, 155 (1998); Kay Kei-Ho Pih et al., Different Strokes 
for Different Gangs? An Analysis of Capital Among Latino and Asian Gang Members, 51 SOC. PERS.
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not only by providing alternative avenues to pursue the kinds of capital to 
which its members have limited access but by creating alternative forms of 
capital that has purchase in spaces and contexts gangs develop for their 
deployment.
In the types of gangs subject to gang injunctions, violence, criminality, 
and entrepreneurialism43 are secondary or tertiary undertakings.44 Instead,
much gang capital creation is undertaken through expressly legal or unreg-
ulated means.45 This more central focus of gangs is pursued primarily 
through the provision of surrogate sources of identity solidarity. Such iden-
tity becomes a valuable resource because the gang fills gaps left by other 
socio-cultural institutions.46 That gap filling results in the formation of a 
shared normative community (distinct from the mainstream normative 
community in which gang members are situated) in which alternative gang 
capital has purchase and cachet.
Gangs engage in a range of activities the core function of which is the 
pursuit of identity formulation and capital creation. The most salient of 
those activities is gangs’ use of the colors, signs, and symbols.47 The dis-
play of gang symbols through hand signs and unique identifying graffiti 
communicates a gang’s presence in and claim of dominance over a geo-
graphic space.48 The borders of a gang’s geographic territory are clearly
charted by its distinctive graffiti.49 By deploying a gang’s symbols—
wearing distinctive clothing and colors, physically marking their body with 
gang tattoos, incorporating gang symbols into their personal belongings, 
and adopting gang vernacular—members occupy space in the community’s 
consciousness, which accords them respect and status within the physical 
space to which they lay claim.
473 (2017) (citing Bourdieu). The Bordieuian construct is not directly addressed in most relevant 
literature, but the substantive insight is consistent with his capital taxonomy.
43. See, e.g., James C. Howell, Menacing or Mimicking? Realities of Youth Gangs, JUV. & FAM.
CT. J., Spring 2007, at 39; MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG: ITS NATURE,
PREVALENCE, AND CONTROL (1995).
44. See GEORGE W. KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS (6th ed. 2006) (citing sources explor-
ing gang typologies).
45. Id. at 301 (discussing the social, economic, and symbolic functions of gangs); Brenda C. 
Coughlin & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Urban Street Gang After 1970, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 41, 44 
(2003) (citing articles creating a general “consensus” that identity construction is the primary function 
of gangs).
46. Distribution and Structures of Gangs, in THE MODERN GANG READER (Arlen Egley et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2006).
47. KNOX, supra note 44; see also ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN & DONALD W. KODLUBOY, GANGS IN 
SCHOOLS: SIGNS, SYMBOLS, AND SOLUTIONS (1998).
48. GOLDSTEIN & KODLUBOY, supra note 47.
49. Cf. David Ley & Roman Cybrinsky, Urban Graffiti as Territorial Markers, 64 ANNALS 
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491, 501 (1974).
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Gang symbology is symbiotically connected to gang territoriality. 
Gangs create physical and psychological territories in which their identity 
has normative force and the capital associated with that identity has posi-
tive value. Gang territoriality itself is also a key aspect of the development 
of gang capital.50 Most gang activity is at least indirectly related to such 
territoriality. For example, gangs physically occupy public and private 
spaces in their claimed geographic territory to reinforce the symbolic terri-
torial markings of graffiti.51 Within secured territories,52 gang members 
often perform traditional functions of owners. They determine access. They 
control markets. They perform protective functions for community mem-
bers.53They disaggregate, cede, and transfer their claims.
This territoriality is, in turn, reinforced by the way gangs deploy their 
personal property, which they imbue with important symbology. The ex-
pressive function of gang regalia is a topic of inconclusive debate. But, 
where access to other legitimate forms of identity property is limited, such 
personal property plays a very important role as identity property, by 
claiming interest in and exclude others from an intangible, intellectual 
space where the gang’s symbology is recognized.54
Re-centered around its core functions, it is clear that the gang capital 
project sketched above constitutes a transgressive engagement not just with 
property, but with identity property, a category of property meriting and 
granted heightened protection or deference because of its close association 
to proper self-development. Gangs are pursuing traditional property val-
ues—they find their place in the world in relationship to their control of 
property—but it is in an alternative property system. Even a cursory exam-
ination of the politics and practicalities of gang injunctions demonstrates 
that injunctions target precisely the identity property function of gangs.
50. This is evidenced, for example, in by the sheer number of gangs whose names are related to 
the geographic territory they claim. Olivier Bangerter, Territorial Gangs and Their Consequences for 
Humanitarian Players, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 387, 396 (2010).
51. Hagedorn, supra note 26.
52. In unstable or contested spaces, territorial claims may be enforced (or charted) through force.
53. George Knox cites gangs that have implemented litter clean up regimes, organized communi-
ty social events, and doled out largess to incapacitated members. Knox also reports that host community 
members themselves may solicit the gang’s exercise of such ownership functions. KNOX, supra note 44,
at 23–24.
54. Benjamin Barros has explored distinction between idea of home and the physical location 
through different means and toward different ends. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 256 (2006) (arguing that only certain types of homes merit the special 
treatment generally accorded to homes in the law).
2017] DIGNITY TAKINGS IN GANGLAND 803
B. Gangs Injunctions as Property Tools
Proponents of gang injunctions frame the gang problems directly ad-
dressed by gang injunctions as protecting the property interests of commu-
nity members against criminal usurpation by gangs.
One consistent theme underlying such justifications for gang injunc-
tions is blight, which is inextricably related to the ways real property is 
understood and valued as a “placeholder” for a broader and different set of 
resources and normative aspirations that results in property owners becom-
ing “much less interested in the on-site attributes of real estate than in the 
people things, services, and conditions lying beyond . . . the property’s 
boundaries.”55 The California Supreme Court described such gang blight as 
the “display [of] casual contempt for notions of law, order, and decency”56
primarily because gang members engage in everyday conduct in an “offen-
sive and disruptive manner.”57 In Monrovia, one city council member ex-
plained that the gang injunction would “go a long way toward cleaning up 
some specific problems in our affected neighborhoods.”58 Another ex-
plained: “It’s going to mean safer and quieter streets.”59
Similarly, the conduct uniquely targeted by gang injunctions con-
strains behaviors that injunction advocates claim impinges on the property 
interests of community members. The relevance to property interests of 
restrictions on carrying instruments capable of defacing property is clear, 
but the property theme is more generally prevalent. For example, the only 
direct harm caused by conduct like trespass, playing loud music, and graffi-
ti is its attack on private property interests.60 Loitering and obstructing 
thruways are associated with public property. The primary harm of the 
expressive and associational activity restricted by gang injunctions is that 
such activity facilitates or protects gang members’ ability to use public, 
private, and common property as they choose, which uses are deemed aes-
55. Lee Anne Fennell has explored this concept from several perspectives in her discussion of the 
ways property “has come unbound from the four corners of the owned parcel.” LEE ANNE FENNELL,
THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 2 (2009).
56. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (1997).
57. People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 70, 74, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (uphold-
ing the gang injunction issued against the Colonia Chiques gang).
58. What the City Council Had to Say, CITY OF MONROVIA, CAL.,
http://www.cityofmonrovia.org/police/page/what-city-council-had-say [https://perma.cc/MDL8-
MNXL].
59. Id.
60. For a detailed treatment of the harm of trespass, see, e.g., Thomas H. Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
804 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:3
thetically objectionable. For example, wearing gang apparel61 causes no 
direct harm, but it purportedly guarantees that gang members will not be 
disturbed while engaging in property-related activity like loitering or block-
ing the streets.
Finally, even though it is most obviously connected to order and 
maintenance policing, gang injunctions function as a land use management 
tool.62 In his well-known article on street order,63 Robert Ellickson justified 
his attention on certain “problems”64 presented by homelessness, like pan-
handling and skid rows, with the intuitive but underexplored assertion that 
“a specialist in property law approaches the issue of street order as a prob-
lem not of speech or of crime, but of land management.”65 Nicole Steele 
Garnett has developed and engaged the connection between land use plan-
ning and street order. Through several pieces, she has created the most 
coherent framework for reinterpreting order-maintenance policy as land use 
policy.66
In this context, gang injunctions may be properly seen as a property 
law corollary to broken windows policing. The most overt tools of an or-
der-maintenance policy orientation pursue this aim through strategies that 
directly or indirectly regulate property uses. An anti-loitering ordinance, for 
example, indirectly dictates acceptable uses for covered public spaces. 
Conversely, property regulation through land use policy itself can manifest 
order-maintenance ideals. Gang injunctions work this way.
A gang injunction is a broad tool used by municipalities to enjoin ac-
tivities in which gangs or a gang’s members are believed to be engaged. 
Based on a list of undesirable activities, the city sues a gang itself as an 
61. This restriction is itself a restriction on traditional forms property, as are many other typical 
provisions.
62. This property function is also a central task of municipal government, which opens space for 
local development of criminal law through these mechanisms.
63. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan-
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996).
64. Ellickson can be and has been criticized for failing to support his normative conclusion that 
panhandling and skid rows themselves properly constitute problems with which local government 
should be concerned. See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on “Chronic Misconduct” in Urban 
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 33 
(1997).
65. Ellickson, supra note 63, at 1166.
66. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Governing? Gentrifying? Seced-
ing? Real-Time Answers to Questions About Business Improvement Districts, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 35 
(2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192 
(2006), Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1077–78 (2005) [hereinafter 
Garnett, Relocating Disorder]; Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2004).
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unincorporated entity—not specific individuals67—to prevent members 
from engaging in those activities, within a defined geographic area. The 
complaints forming the basis of a gang injunction have become standard-
ized, drawing heavily on a civil and criminal public nuisance statute, which 
has both civil and penal components and defines nuisance broadly: 
“[a]nything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property” constitutes a nui-
sance.68 A nuisance becomes public when it “affects at the same time an 
entire community or neighborhood or any considerable number of per-
sons,”69 and it becomes criminal when it has a “distinctively public quali-
ty.”70 The public nuisance law offers three consequential paths for each 
injunction violation: (a) misdemeanor public nuisance charges, which in-
volve criminal prosecutions, (b) civil contempt of court, subjecting injunc-
tees to monetary fines up to $1000, or (3) criminal contempt of court, 
subjecting injunctees to a maximum of six months in jail.
Monrovia’s gang injunction closely follows the standard form, target-
ing a wide range of conduct not otherwise prohibited in California Penal 
Code.71 More important, the full range of behaviors in which gang mem-
bers might to generate or sustain identity property are flexibly proscribed 
by the gang:
1. standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering, bicycling or otherwise 
appear in the public view with any known gang member;
2. “marking substances” that could be used to deface real or personal 
property (i.e. pens);
3. using words, phrases, physical gestures or symbols (i.e. gang signs), 
or engaging in other forms of communication that describe or refer 
to the gang; and
4. wearing gang clothes.72
67. A key component of gang injunctions is their reliance on California’s “time-honored equita-
ble practice applicable to labor unions, abortion protestors or other identifiable groups” of pursuing 
equitable remedies against identifiable groups (regardless of their incorporation status) because “such
groups can act only through the medium of their membership. To effect this principle, at least some 
specific gang members are named as representatives of the named gang. Then, the gang, through those 
representatives (and other gang members who step forward to speak for the gang), is given the oppor-
tunity to challenge the injunction, generally, and its particular provisions, specifically, according to 
procedures applicable to any other civil injunction. The named gang members may also challenge their 
inclusion in the proposed injunction. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (1997).
68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2016) (specifically including drug dealing).
69. Id. § 3480.
70. Gallo, 929 P.2d at 604.
71. EDWARD L. ALLAN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
POLICING BY INJUNCTION (2004).
72. O’DEANE, supra note 37, at 59, 137, 404, 541.
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The Monrovia injunction specifically targets residents not only of the 
city of Monrovia but of the adjacent unincorporated areas and the neighbor-
ing town, Duarte, which expressly rejected Monrovia’s invitation to partic-
ipate in its gang injunction claim. The injunction also applies to a very 
large “safety zone” that includes the entire unincorporated area adjacent to
the city, and—more important—covers approximately eighty percent of the 
city itself, including all business districts and all but one school and exclud-
ing only the richest part of town. Considered in the context of the injunc-
tion’s expansive spatial application, the consequences of targeting residents 
are clear. A gang injunction targeting non-residents leaves an enjoined 
gang member free to go home. Where is the resident injunctee free to go?
Gang injunctions have been deployed with considerable variation.73
Some jurisdictions use injunctions to reduce the number of gang members 
on the street at any given moment by performing gang sweeps.74 Other
jurisdictions report that police officers “get more mileage from the gang 
injunctions by using them as a negotiating tool to gain information on the 
streets.”75 Gang injunctions also impose indirect but significant practical 
consequences on injunctees that are unrelated to the enforcement of the 
gang injunction. For example, the injunction will be revealed in any back-
ground check, which limits injunctees’ access to legitimate employment 
and both public and private housing.76
Through this lens, gang injunctions fit squarely within the land use 
management analytical category.77 Garnett describes “neighborhood-
exclusion zone” policies that use zoning and trespass principles to affect 
the same sort of first generation change at which gang injunctions aim.78
While the latter land use policies manifest order-maintenance ideals, gang 
injunction order-maintenance policies manifest land use planning princi-
ples.79
73. GANG INJUNCTION COMM., MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT OF GANG INJUNCTIONS, in 2003–2004
L.A. CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 169 (2004), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury03-
04/LACGJFR_03-04.pdf (demonstrating that gang injunctions result in relatively few arrests and even 
fewer direct or formal legal sanctions).
74. O’DEANE, supra note 37, at 71.
75. Id.
76. Lindsay Crawford, No Way Out: An Analysis of Exit Processes for Gang Injunctions, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 161, 180 (2009).
77. Gang injunctions also resemble sex offender residency programs, which have been explicitly 
and implicitly recognized as land use management policies. See, e.g., Asmara M. Tekle, In the Zone: 
Sex Offenders and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 610 (2009).
78. Garnett, Relocating Disorder, supra note 66, at 1092.
79. To use Ellickson’s proposed model, the definition of the target or safety zone defines the 
boundaries of an implicit red zone (i.e. an area with high levels of chronic disorder) that the city is using 
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That many gang injunction provisions are not directly related to land 
does not detract from the point. From the city’s perspective, the personal 
property and liberty restrictions that dominate gang injunctions are instru-
mental substitutes for and complements to the real property decisions codi-
fied therein. Moreover, the link between real property and personal 
“identity property”80 in the gang context transforms personal property into 
a realty proxy for gang members marginalized from access to such property 
in their communities.
IV. GANG INJUNCTIONS AS DIGNITY TAKINGS: A STUDY81
The admixture of prevailing sociological understandings of gangs and 
the critical synthesis of property theory forms an apt springboard from 
which to launch an argument that gang injunctions constitute dignity tak-
ings. This article does not engage that self-evident theoretical exercise. 
Instead, it engages in a dignity takings analysis of the data collected in an 
empirical study of the Monrovia Gang Injunction. That qualitative analysis 
indicates that the Monrovia Gang Injunction does effect dignity takings.
A. Methods, Data, and Limitations
The gang injunction study examined the experiences of public offi-
cials, community members, and individuals subject to the Monrovia Gang 
Injunction. Among the primary hypotheses tested was that the effect of 
gang injunctions on the injunctees is to intensify their experience of mar-
ginalization. The human subjects research took place only after several 
years of (non-continuous) background research concerning gangs, gang 
injunctions, the cities of Monrovia and Duarte, California, and the history 
of gangs in the two cities, as well as elsewhere in suburban Los Angeles 
and Orange Counties, California. The initial research period included the 
collection of local histories and the development of relevant community 
contacts.
To answer the primary research questions, I conducted in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with thirty-five injunctees, ten current and former 
the gang injunction to turn yellow (i.e. occasional but not chronic disorder is permissible). Ellickson, 
supra note 63, 1220–23.
80. For an elaboration of this idea, which refers to that property that implicates an individual or 
group’s vocational humanity, ontological humanity and epistemological humanity, or their identity, see 
Yuille, supra note 3.
81. A full report of the study—conducted only after a required review by the institutional review 
board at the University of Kansas—and its findings will be made available in one or more subsequent 
publications.
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public officials, and twelve community members.82 Each interview, the 
majority of which were conducted during June and July 2016, lasted be-
tween sixty and ninety minutes. The interviews were audio taped and tran-
scribed, and the interviewees were given the promise of confidentiality (all
the names used in this article are pseudonyms, and biographical data have 
been obscured to protect the identity of the respondent). At the outset of 
each interview, the interviewee was given a demographic survey in which 
they provided standard demographic data and, as relevant, indicated wheth-
er they had ever been affiliated with gang. The majority of interviews were 
conducted one person at a time, in person. In a few instances, I conducted 
focus group style interviews. Generally, only the interviewee and I were 
present for the interviews. In a significant minority of cases, a co-
investigator was present. The enlistment of co-investigators, became neces-
sary to obtain access to several injunctees who initially expressed reluc-
tance to participate in the study. My co-investigators were both local 
community members. They did not ask any questions or participate in in-
terviews with injunctees with whom they had previously been acquainted.
To gain access to the injunctees, I relied on existing community rela-
tionships with individuals who were able to share contact information of 
the individuals named in the gang injunction. Those names were publicly 
available. My reliance on community connections limited the injunctee 
population to which I ultimately had access to, primarily, Black male in-
junctees.83 No females have been subject to the Monrovia Gang Injunction. 
I deemed it prudent to exclude from the study (a) minors and (b) incarcer-
ated individuals. Notwithstanding these limitations, an appreciable percent-
age of Black individuals subject to the Monrovia Gang Injunction 
eventually participated in the study.
Community actors were also able to provide direct contact information 
for public officials, which included present and former members of city 
council (including three mayors) and other city employees, school adminis-
trators, and law enforcement (including the police chief). Participants were 
82. Interviews began with one of the following questions, as appropriate:
I am interested in understanding what gang injunctions mean to the real people they are imposed on. 
Tell me about what you experienced being subject to the gang injunction.
I am trying to understand what motivates a city to [seek] [enforce] a gang injunction. Please tell me 
about your role in the [implementation] [enforcement] of the gang injunction? What [do] [did] you hope 
it would accomplish?
I am interested in understanding how gang injunctions impact communities where they are used. Tell 
me about what you experienced having a gang injunction in your [neighborhood] [city].
83. All Monrovia injunctees are male and either Black or Hispanic (as described in the city’s
records). 
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also solicited via Institutional Review Board-approved emails, which were 
distributed through community contacts.
In addition to the interviews, I consulted a range of sources such as 
government documents, court documents, social media, and newspapers. 
As outlined above, I also relied on the academic literature to frame my 
analysis.
This study is the first to comprehensively (both vertically and horizon-
tally) engage the human impacts of a gang injunction. It is also the first 
study to examine a suburban gang injunction. Nevertheless, it has several 
limitations.
First, as noted above, injunctee interviewees skewed Black and male. 
However, two-thirds of the individuals enjoined by the Monrovia Gang 
Injunction were identified by law enforcement as belonging to or being 
associated with the Latino gang Monrovia Nuevo Varrio. Unlike the Black 
injunctee interviewees, none of the Latino injunctee interviewees admitted 
membership in that or any other gang. Whether the trends identified for 
Black injunctees would hold with the broader group is wholly unpredicta-
ble.
The study design and approach also neglected to systematically ac-
count for the experience of females (and non-enjoined males) who may 
have been closely related to and therefore significantly impacted by the 
gang injunction. The study identified three family groups for whom this 
was clearly a distinct possibility. Thus, the conclusions drawn are neces-
sarily under-inclusive.
The study is also inherently limited by its interview methodology. The 
validity of interview data is undermined when interviewees give false, mis-
leading, or inaccurate information. The reasons such information might be 
provided include embarrassment, concern about confidentiality, and mis-
remembering. All of these are significant to this study. Interviews were 
designed to minimize these risks, especially for the injunctees who were 
never asked about their actual gang affiliation except in the anonymous 
survey they completed at the outset.
Finally, I myself constitute a limitation (and a strength) of this study. 
There is no such thing as neutral information. In qualitative data of the 
nature gathered in this study, that fact is less obscured than in other areas. 
Nevertheless, it is important to clearly delineate the ways I, as an individu-
al, am injected into the results. Not only is the design and reporting of the 
data collection a product of the lenses with which I view the world, but my 
status as a (relatively) young, Black, third-generation Monrovian from a 
fairly prominent local family also impacted the data I was able to collect. 
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For example, among the most common responses to questions I asked 
of Black interviewees, especially those that could be interpreted as impli-
cating race, was “you know.” Interviewees were also easily familiar with 
me as they described landmarks, history, and local cultural settlements. 
Therefore, I read the data with the gloss of common understanding and 
culture. I consider these implications of my positionality strengths of the 
study.84 Whether my position constitutes a strength or limitation is much 
harder to predict with respect to local officials. Coming from a prominent 
family undoubtedly facilitated access to the local officials I interviewed 
(none of whom I previously knew personally). However, I cannot measure 
the impact of my Blackness on the candor of public officials, especially 
since a significant faction of the city opposed the Monrovia Gang Injunc-
tion as a racist mechanism.85 The limitations I identify present practical and 
analytical challenges, but they do not undermine the empirical value of the 
study or substantially impede the robust analysis of gang injunctions as
dignity takings.
B. Discussion
As outlined above, dignity takings constitute a special extraordinary 
class of involuntary property loss. To qualify, two (broadly construed) ele-
ments must be met. First, there must be an involuntary loss of property: “A 
state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property from owners or 
occupiers . . . .”86 Second, the taking must inflict sub-personhood on the 
dispossessed: “whom it deems to be sub persons.”
The theoretical analysis outlined above and elaborated in prior schol-
arship builds a strong case that gang injunctions inflict a dignity taking on 
84. I also found it beneficial that neither I nor my family who still live in Monrovia were directly 
impacted by the Monrovia gang injunction itself. I myself, however, was directly impacted by at least 
one of the events that is seen as a catalyst for the eventual adoption of the gang injunction. I did not, 
nevertheless, learn about or have any involvement with the injunction until it became the subject of the 
predicate studies.
85. Several local official and community member respondents reported that the city was forced to 
hold community fora at important Black churches specifically to address these issues. Government 
officials also reported public communications being carefully crafted (and redrafted) to avoid tele-
graphing racist intent. Except for Monrovia city officials, who uniformly rejected the idea that race 
played any role in the injunction, respondents displayed varying opinions on the matter. They, however, 
uniformly reported that the neighboring city of Duarte refused to join the injunction because that city 
interpreted the mechanism as imposing unacceptable racial costs.
86. As noted above, originally the analysis required that the taking occurred without paying just 
compensation or without a legitimate public purpose. As the framework has developed, these elements 
have been called into question. In the present context, the consideration of these elements would com-
plicate the dignity taking analysis but not defeat the finding of a dignity taking. Since the conceptual 
usefulness of these elements has been challenged elsewhere, the present article will not undertake such 
an analysis.
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injunctees. The gang injunction study provides empirical support for this 
conclusion.
1. Involuntary Property Loss: “A State Directly or Indirectly Destroys 
or Confiscates Property from Owners or Occupiers . . . .”
That the Monrovia Gang Injunction inflicts a direct deprivation by the 
government of the property of injunctees is beyond question. By its explicit 
terms, this is what—at least in part—the gang injunction does. The depriva-
tion—re-borrowing from the constitutional takings framework from which 
it evolved—is primarily regulatory in character. That is, the material or 
physical property of the injunctees is not necessarily confiscated nor de-
stroyed via gang injunction, but the nature of the gang injunction deprives 
the injunctees of core rights associated with property, including the right to 
possess and the right to use. Those property rights are confiscated. And, 
with respect to the property at issue, those deprivations effectively leave 
the dispossessed with nothing. Of course, the gang injunction also indirect-
ly authorizes the direct confiscation of the physical property of gang in-
junctees, who reported having clothing, personal items, and school supplies 
confiscated by police as evidence of gang injunction violations. The gang 
injunction even constituted part of a government-designed program to 
physically deprive certain individuals of their homes and remove them 
from the city of Monrovia using a variety of mechanisms that also included 
traditional condemnation.
However, the empirical data complicates this uncontroversial conclu-
sion. Both the injunctee interviewees and public officials almost wholly 
ignored the many instances of the deprivation of traditionally recognized 
property as the important takings effected by the gang injunction. Instead, 
they clearly identified the property implicated by the gang injunctions as 
what has been described, here, as identity property (i.e. the status and pur-
chase conferred through the gang)—that is, they focused on the gang in-
junction’s impact on those valuable resources associated with the 
injunctees’ identity as a gang member.87
Describing how the gang injunction dismantled the relationships he 
developed, one man explained,
Well me personally, I feel like the gang injunction is a way of separating 
people or somethin’ like, you know, like people I might have grown up 
with all my life, I might have grown up with em’ an now they come with 
this gang injunction where it should be family injunction if anything I 
87. In Blood In, Buyout, I give article-length treatment to how and why gang identity constitutes 
identity property. See Yuille, supra note 3.
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feel like, you know? I mean like people I grew up with, I’m 21 right now 
and people I been playin’ in the sand box since I was 5 with, you know, 
they tryin’ to tell them, you can’t be with him. You know? And it be 
somebody’s that like family I grew up with all my life and they separat-
ing us, you can’t be with him.
More directly, another man explained: “It feels like OG segregation, 
baby, let me tell you.”
Reflecting on the deprivation of status, space, and place, one man ex-
plained:
It’s like you know, well if somebody can’t be somewhere they been all 
their life, you know it’s no place like home. So once they bring you up 
outta there, you out your safe zone, your comfort zone. So now you gotta 
go somewhere else . . . they don’t care where you go really . . . .
Even more explicitly connecting the gang injunction to the destruction 
of status conferring identity property—here described as a label—another 
man said this: “It’s also scaring the neighbors. It has them scared to even 
have us come in they house and near their house cause now we got this bad 
label. We used to have a good one.”
All of these echo the experience described by Trezy Loc of being 
curbed. The status he normally demanded, created, sustained “loc’d up” on 
the corner was systematically dismantled as he was stripped on the curb 
from his community to see. Yes, he lamented the loss of his notebook and 
lyrics. However, the loss of place and status was more significant.
This deprivation is exactly the type of deprivation that local govern-
ment actors indicated they hoped the gang injunction would effect. For 
example, one official explained that in the period leading up to the gang 
injunction a large number of criminal gang members had returned to the 
city after having been released from prison. These individuals, they argued, 
were the germinators of the problem. “The gang injunction helped knock 
them down. And that’s what we wanted to do. Knock them down . . . or get 
them out.”
School officials were enlisted to this task, as well. For example, 
monthly debriefing sessions were held for some time at which the middle 
and high school principals were asked to identify gang members for moni-
toring. Police would determine to serve those identified by school officials 
with an injunction. Further cooperation among school administrations and 
police more directly served this function. Trezy Loc reported that he was 
publicly pulled out of class by the police to determine compliance with the 
gang injunction. While he, again, noted that his material property was con-
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fiscated. His answer focused on the deprivation of status effected by his 
public subjugation to hyper-surveillance: “They let the police come an get 
me right from my class. How they gonna do me like that? How’my ‘posed 
to represent after that? Feel me? . . . And they ain’t give me back my note-
book.”
The data suggests then, that the gang injunction effects—by design—a
comprehensive involuntary property deprivation. The symbology that the 
injunctees may deploy using their personal property to create identity prop-
erty that conferred status in and access to the alternate market they were 
creating was purposefully dismantled via the gang injunction. As discussed 
above, regardless of any disapprobation of gangs, it is important to recog-
nize (a) the identity property function they play and (b) that identity proper-
ty is precisely that category of property to which highest deference is owed. 
Indeed, in the elaboration of the dignity taking framework, Atuahene 
stresses the epistemological, ontological, and vocational value of property 
as a core justification of theorizing dignity takings as a special, extraordi-
nary category of involuntary property loss. As the framework is being 
elaborated, this “admixture”88 among traditional notions of ownership and 
more robust conceptions of has dignity and humanity has remained a core 
attraction and site of expansion and elaboration.
2. Inflicting Sub-Personhood: “. . . Whom it Deems to be 
Sub Persons”
In addition to the question of whether gang identity property is of a 
nature and value worth or appropriate for a dignity takings analysis, the 
data collected in the study complicate the second step of the dignity takings 
analysis: determining whether the taking of that property inflicts sub-
personhood on injunctees.
In the dignity takings framework, sub-persons are those who are inten-
tionally or unintentionally dehumanized or infantilized by the agent perpe-
trating the taking. Core to this concept is the attack of the dispossessed’s
equal human worth or autonomy. Atuahene’s South African case—in 
which colonial to apartheid regimes forcibly removed Black South Africans 
from their homes and property–is definitionally paradigmatic. Neither the 
“top down” nor “bottom up” construction of the narrative yields a result 
clearly analogizeable to that experience. Nevertheless, critical considera-
tion of the concepts suggest that the gang injunction is properly character-
88. Justin B. Richland, Dignity as (Self-)Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the Face of US 
Dispossessions, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 917, 920 (2016).
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ized as infantilizing the injunctees, denying full recognition to their capaci-
ty to reason and autonomy.
As Atuahene neatly charted, infantilization is the rejection of a per-
son’s capacity for “rational self-governance.”89 The standard example of 
this concept is treating adults as if they were children. From that perspec-
tive, the data collected would indicate that no infantilization occurred. All 
public officials repeated emphatically, though inaccurately, that no juve-
niles had been subjected to the Monrovia Gang Injunction. “No. No. No. 
We didn’t do kids. They were all adults.” A robust literature exists docu-
menting this phenomenon, i.e. the paradox of Black boys’ experiences, 
which consists of the “vacillat[ion] between making them babies and mak-
ing them men.”90 Sometime before the age of eight or nine, “their child-
hood evaporates”91 and officials begin to think of them as men. Thus, they 
are not infantilized, they are “adultized.”
Of course, to adultize a young Black male is to treat him like an adult 
Black male. What that means, however, is that they are objects of fear and 
targets of control. “We feel compelled to control Black male bodies at all 
times.”92 That fear is rooted in paradigmatic constructs of dehumanization. 
Control, meanwhile, is rooted in straightforward infantilization.
This construct is borne out by the data collected. One injunctee de-
scribed his uncertainty: “I couldn’t even be outside helping my mom with 
the groceries at night . . . I did nothing wrong but unjustly live in constant 
fear of doing something that might be perceived as a violation.”
Like most of the injunctees interviewed, a respondent we called CDC 
described being partially stripped and searched in public view on the street. 
Describing how the police treated him, he eventually shared: “They treated 
me like I was grown, but they didn’t treat me like I’m a man. They never 
treat me like a man.”
That idea proved sticky for many interviewees. They clearly described 
being viewed as culpable in adult terms: “Everything changed at about 12 
years old. Wait, I don’t know, eight grade. Well, it changed for us. That 
didn’t happen to the white kids. . . I’m not trying to make this a race thing. 
I’m just sayin’ . . . . They never let us off for just kids no more.” But they 
also refused to entertain having been treated like an autonomous actor. 
89. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 32 (2014).
90. Gloria Ladson Billings, Boyz to Men? Teaching to Restore Black Boys’ Childhood, in THE
EDUCATION OF BLACK MALES IN A ‘POST-RACIAL’ WORLD 10 (Anthony L. Brown & Jamel K. Donner 
eds., 2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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When asked whether the shift in treatment meant he was treated “like a 
man,” CDC replied, “I ain’t no man. . . to my boys, yes . . . but to them 
po’po’s, nope.”
The tenor of injunctee comments was consistent with reports from lo-
cal officials. School officials reported that the elementary schools were 
only tangentially involved with the anti-gang efforts, while the middle 
schools were asked to become vigilant sources of gang intelligence for the 
police. Children in injunctee families were identified only to middle and 
high schools for additional surveillance, and middle and high school offi-
cials were instructed not to address disciplinary issues involving those stu-
dents and other “at risk” children internally without gang unit involvement.
From law enforcement and local government officials the complica-
tion was clear. One official explaining the benefits of the gang injunction 
said:
These boys . . . I mean they’re not boys. These aren’t kids. They’re men. 
Well . . . these guys. Yeah. These guys just don’t know what to do with 
themselves on the outside. They let them out and they just prey on the 
community. So . . . well . . . the injunction gives us a way to help them 
find something else to do with their lives. They take our resources; they 
grow up . . . that, or they can get out.93
V. CONCLUSION
This article began with the recognition that gangs are, essentially, 
networked institutions aimed at the creation of identity property, defined as 
those kinds of property that implicate epistemological, ontological, and 
vocational humanity—that is, that property which implicates how people 
are and understand themselves as human and go about the business of that 
office. That view casts a critical spotlight on gang injunctions (a primary 
tool in the anti-gang strategy), which prohibit members of specified gangs 
from engaging in a wide range of otherwise lawful activities through which 
gangs generate and sustain that identity property.
Using the gang injunction study, the results of which are summarized 
and excerpted above, the article shines that spotlight on the gang injunction 
in effect in Monrovia, California, one suburban frontier of Los Angeles’ 
notorious gangland. The results suggest that gang injunctions conceal a 
significant wrong being perpetrated by hundreds of cities across America. 
Rather than effective law enforcement mechanisms, gang injunctions effect 
dignity takings: they are involuntary deprivations of property that inflict 
sub-personhood on their targets. Laid bare, this should not be surprising. 
93. In the preceding transcript excerpt, ellipsis indicate pauses or hesitation, not omissions.
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As I have claimed elsewhere, gangs occupy a uniquely vilified position in 
American popular consciousness. Indeed, gangs are cast as animalistic 
institutions. That approaches to manage and destroy them would deny gang 
members of their equal human worth and autonomy seems natural. This 
insight is important to the study of gangs and gang injunctions.
The enrichment of the dignity takings framework borne from this 
study is also important. First, it provides empirical support for the exten-
sion of the theory’s ambit from traditionally recognized forms of property 
to other valued resources with the normative force of property. When talk-
ing about how they experienced the gang injunction, study participants 
uniformly engaged property deprivation discourses with more severity and
importance with respect to identity property values (regardless of the nature 
of that property) than to mere material property.
The study also reorganizes the concept of infantilization for the pur-
poses of dignity takings and blurs the distinction between that concept and 
the idea of dehumanization. As originally formulated, infantilization was 
epitomized by the treatment of adults as if they were minors, denying their 
full capacity to reason. The Monrovia Gang Injunction, as experienced by 
injunctees, appears to have inverted the concept. Youth and minors were 
treated as adults, whose deviance merited restriction of autonomy. This is 
no less a deprivation of dignity. At the same time, the actualization of this 
adultization means that the Black youth injunctees would be treated like 
Black men. Black men are, in turn, systematically infantilized and dehu-
manized by the law and legal actors.
What is left to ask is this: If gang injunctions constitute dignity tak-
ings, how might the dignity of gangs be restored? The dignity taking analy-
sis demands a remedy that reasserts the dignity of the dispossessed gang 
injunctees and confirms that they are full citizens.94 In other contexts, I 
have explored the idea of “paid gang injunctions” as performing just such a 
re-integratory function. Therefore, I close with a conundrum.
Dignity restoration in South Africa was embedded in a new, post-
apartheid (not idealized) South Africa. As societies learn from that pro-
gram, must they not interrogate what “full citizenship” might mean? In the 
#BlackLivesMatter age, what is full citizenship to the Monrovia injunc-
tees? As Trezy Loc noted in an aside unrelated to his experience with the 
gang injunction: “Monrovia has a lot of nice things, but . . . you know . . .
they not for us. Not for people like us.” That “us” was not gang injunctees. 
That “us” was him and me. Two Black Monrovians.
94. ATUAHENE, supra note 89, at 164.
